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NOTE
Kelo's Wake:
In Search of a Proportional Benefit
JENNIE C. NOLON*
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination,
and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property;
or that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and
exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion
of the right of any other individual in the universe .... 1
I. INTRODUCTION: EMINENT DOMAIN AND THE
BUNDLE OF STICKS
As students are introduced to the concept of property law,
they are taught: "Protection of our property is vital to our sense of
security and is a core function of our legal system."2 At odds with
this notion of property protection is the idea, embedded within the
United States Constitution, that the government may take prop-
erty for a public use so long as just compensation is provided.3
This ideological divide has been the source of constant legal de-
* Special thanks to my father and mentor, John R. Nolon, for his inspiration
and infinite support. Additional thanks to my friends-the dedicated members of the
Pace Environmental Law Review-for their hard work and patience. Jennie C. Nolon
is a joint degree student at Pace University School of Law and the Yale School of
Forestry and Environmental Studies.
1. A. JAMES CASNER ET AL., CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 3 (2004) (quoting WrL-
LIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (facsimile of the 1st ed.
of 1765-1769, Univ. of Chi. Press 1979) (1766)).
2. Id. at 1 ("To achieve proper self-development-to be a person-an individual
needs some control over resources in the external environment. The necessary assur-
ances of control take the form of property rights." (quoting Margaret Jane Radin,
Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982))).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation").
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bate and judicial determinations 4 and is the result of a belief
within the American system of government that personal inter-
ests must occasionally bow to the greater public good.5
In the summer of 2005, the Supreme Court decided the case of
Kelo v. City of New London.6 In a five-to-four decision, a divided
Court confronted the issue of whether the taking of private prop-
erty for economic development "satisfies the 'public use' require-
ment of the Fifth Amendment"7 as applied to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment.8 Ultimately, the majority decided
that it did, stating that the legislative "determination that the
area [at issue] was sufficiently distressed to justify a program of
economic rejuvenation [was] entitled to [judicial] deference." 9
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens cited a number of cases
4. For an example of a discussion of property as exclusive dominion, see Carol M.
Rose, Cannons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 603-04
(1998) ("It may be that this very definition somehow constantly elicits similar argu-
mentative strategies-raising worrisome doubts about existing entitlements or elicit-
ing soothing appeals to usefulness on the one hand or to tradition on the other ....
When Blackstone described property as exclusive dominion, he may have had little
idea of the resonance his words would have for later writers on property. Indeed, the
notion of property as exclusive dominion-a notion to which I will refer as the Exclu-
sivity Axiom-is far from self-evident .... Blackstone asserted that the law properly
recognizes claims by the destitute to some minimal assistance from those who are
more prosperous. This position links Blackstone to a traditional view tying property
to social and political obligation-a view that clearly creates some tension with the
idea of property as absolute or exclusive dominion. Hence it might be best to conclude
that for Blackstone, the Exclusivity Axiom was in a sense a trope, a rhetorical figure
describing an extreme or ideal type rather than reality .... In identifying property
with the right to exclude, then, Blackstone struck a central nerve in modern discus-
sions of property, and meditations, transmutations, and fulminations on the theme of
exclusivity continue to run through modern cases and commentaries.").
5. See, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("Government
hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be dimin-
ished without paying for every such change in the general law. As long recognized
some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police
power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its limits or the contract and
due process clauses are gone."); see also Robert J. Goldstein, Green Wood in the Bun-
dle of Sticks: Fitting Environmental Ethics and Ecology into Real Property Law, 25
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 347, 362 (1998) (discussing the "inherent limitation to prop-
erty rights").
6. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
7. Id. at 477. The Fifth Amendment's guarantee "was designed to bar Govern-
ment from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." Armstrong v. United States, 364
U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
8. See Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1987).
9. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484 ("Given the comprehensive character of the plan, the
thorough deliberation that preceded its adoption, and the limited scope of our review,
it is appropriate for us, as it was in Berman, to resolve the challenges of the individual
owners, not on a piecemeal basis, but rather in light of the entire plan. Because that
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol24/iss1/11
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for the proposition that "public use" is a broad term, synonymous
with "public purpose."' 0 The dissent, written by Justice O'Connor,
argued that the language cited by the majority for this proposition
from the cases Berman v. Parker11 and Hawaii Housing Authority
v. MidkifP2 was "errant language" 13 and that the concept of public
use is narrower than the concept of public purpose. 14 Because of
their differences on this issue, the justices could not agree on the
breadth of the power of eminent domain. The majority stated that
its opinion dealt with the narrow issue of whether area-wide rede-
velopment in a distressed urban environment justified exercising
eminent domain power.' 5 The dissent feared that the majority
had broadened the definition of public use so that every Ameri-
can's property would now be subject to condemnation:
[N]early any lawful use of real private property can be said to
generate some incidental benefit to the public. Thus, if pre-
dicted (or even guaranteed) positive side-effects are enough to
render transfer from one private party to another constitutional,
then the words "for public use" do not realistically exclude any
takings, and thus do not exert any constraint on the eminent
domain power .... The specter of condemnation hangs over all
property. Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any
Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or
any farm with a factory. 16
One month prior to the Kelo decision, the Supreme Court de-
cided the case of Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 17 This landmark
decision clarified the current state of regulatory takings'8 juris-
plan unquestionably serves a public purpose, the takings challenged here satisfy the
public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.").
10. Id. at 481-82.
11. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
12. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
13. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 501 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 472.
16. Id. at 501-03.
17. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
18. A regulatory taking can be defined as "[a] regulation that is so intrusive that
it is found to take private property for a public purpose without providing the land-
owner with just compensation." JOHN R. NOLON, WELL GROUNDED: USING LOCAL
LAND USE AUTHORITY To ACHIEVE SMART GROWTH 454 (2001). The field of regulatory
takings began in 1922 when, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922),
"the Supreme Court recognized that, even if the government does not seize or occupy
a property, a governmental regulation can work a taking if it 'goes too far."' Smith v.
Mendon, 822 N.E.2d 1214, 1217 (N.Y. 2004).
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prudence by compartmentalizing regulatory takings cases into
four distinct categories. 19 In doing so, the Court unanimously
held that the Agins "substantially advances" test 20 has no place in
takings jurisprudence because it is essentially a due process anal-
ysis. 21 While eliminating the "substantially advances" test from
the regulatory takings equation, the Court set out the categories
under which a government regulation might constitute a taking of
private property.22 The regulatory takings categories, as set forth
in Lingle, are: (1) where the individual property owner suffers a
permanent physical invasion of property (like that in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.);23 (2) where a property
owner is deprived of all economically beneficial or productive use
of his or her land (as in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil);24 (3) where all economic use is not taken but the economic
impact of the regulation is so severe that the court must turn to a
multi-factor balancing test (from Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City);25 and (4) where a condition is imposed on the
19. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548 ("[A] plaintiff seeking to challenge a government
regulation as an uncompensated taking of private property may proceed... by alleg-
ing a 'physical' taking [like that in Loretto], a Lucas-type 'total regulatory taking,' a
Penn Central taking, or a land-use exaction violating the standards set forth in Nol-
lan and Dolan.").
20. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (The Supreme Court,
responding to a facial challenge to two municipal zoning ordinances, established that
"[tihe application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a [regulatory]
taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, or
denies an owner economically viable use of his land.") (citation omitted).
21. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540.
22. Id. at 538-39.
23. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982)
(A landlord was required, pursuant to state law, to permit a cable television company
to install its cable facilities upon her apartment building. The Court held that where
a governmental action results in a permanent physical occupation of the property-no
matter how minor-by the government itself or by others, it is a per se taking "to the
extent of the occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an important
public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner" and the govern-
ment must therefore provide just compensation.).
24. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (holding it to be a
per se taking when a governmental regulation completely deprives an owner of all
economically beneficial or productive use of his property, unless that use is preventa-
ble under nuisance law or other background principles that existed at the time the
regulation was adopted).
25. Pa. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (Though
there is no set formula for evaluating regulatory takings claims, there are "several
factors that have particular significance. The economic impact of the regulation on
the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course relevant considerations. So,
too, is the character of the government action. A 'taking' may more readily be found
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol24/iss1/11
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issuance of a development approval that requires a landowner to
dedicate land to the public, to allow the public access on private
land, or to pay a fee in lieu of such requirements thereby violating
the "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" criteria set forth
in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission26 and Dolan v. City of
Tigard.27 This final category of cases, known as adjudicative land
use exactions, 28 most closely implicates the fundamental right of
property ownership 29 at issue in eminent domain cases. In fact,
the two cases used to define the exactions category, Nollan and
Dolan, describe the right to exclude others from one's land as "one
when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by
government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.") (citations
omitted).
26. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) ("[C]onstitutional
propriety disappears... if the condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to
further the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition. When that essential
nexus is eliminated, the situation becomes the same as if California law forbade
shouting fire in a crowded theater, but granted dispensations to those willing to con-
tribute $ 100 to the state treasury.... In short, unless the permit condition serves the
same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a
valid regulation of land use but 'an out-and-out plan of extortion."').
27. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) ("We think a term such as
'rough proportionality' best encapsulates what we hold to be the requirement of the
Fifth Amendment. No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must
make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is re-
lated both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.").
28. Exactions are defined as "land-use decisions conditioning approval of develop-
ment on the dedication of property to public use." City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999); see also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546 (2005) (describing an exaction as a situation where the "gov-
ernment demands that a landowner dedicate an easement allowing public access to
her property as a condition of obtaining a development permit").
29. See generally Goldstein, supra note 5, at 368 (describing ownership as "a bun-
dle of rights and privileges invested with a single name" (quoting Justice Cardozo in
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937))) (citation omitted).
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of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights30 that are com-
monly characterized as property."31
This article proposes a framework for the classification of emi-
nent domain condemnations in line with that of the regulatory
takings scheme set forth in Lingle.32 In doing so, it also attempts
to explain the majority's decision in Kelo and reconcile it with the
fears of the dissenters by applying the insight of Justice Ken-
nedy's concurring opinion. In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy
clarified that his agreement with the majority did "not foreclose
the possibility that a more stringent standard of review than that
announced in Berman and Midkiff might be appropriate for a
more narrowly drawn category of takings .... [But, tihis is not the
occasion for conjecture as to what sort of cases might justify a
more demanding standard. . .."33
This article will evaluate the types of cases that may indeed
justify a more demanding standard. It argues that, akin to the
Lingle regulatory takings scheme, there are four discrete catego-
ries of eminent domain cases: (1) public ownership of the taken
property; (2) actual use by the public of the property; (3) economic
development with a significant governmental presence or exigent
circumstance; and (4) a fourth category in which a new (higher
level of scrutiny) judicial test is warranted. Part II of this article
will provide the background information that set the stage for the
Kelo decision. Part III offers a method for defining each proposed
category of eminent domain cases and suggests an approach for
the appropriate judicial test of validity for category-four condem-
30. See generally id. at 366-74 ("The 'bundle of rights' metaphor is generally at-
tributed either to Supreme Court Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo (1870-1938) or Profes-
sor Hohfeld, although it is questionable that either actually first coined that phrase,
used it as a legal metaphor, or applied it to property. The first use of this term ap-
pears in the 1888 Treatise on the Law of Eminent Domain in the United States by
John Lewis (1842-1921). 'The dullest individual among the people knows and under-
stands that his property in anything is a bundle of rights.'... In essence, the 'bundle
of rights' divides ownership into its component pieces, with implicitly varying impor-
tance, and with only an unstated degree of severability .... The bundle concept is
valuable for its notion of divisibility and accumulation of diverse and varying 'sticks'
that can amount to ownership. There seems to be no fixed formulation for when these
incidents rise to the level that some people term ownership.").
31. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
176 (1979)). See also Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831; CASNER, supra note 1, at 3 ("[Tlhe es-
sence of private property is always the right to exclude others .... (quoting Morris R.
Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8-12, 14-30 (1927))).
32. Lingle, 544 U.S. 528.
33. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 493 (2005) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
[Vol. 24276
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nations. Part IV will then conclude by reviewing the reasoning for
this new approach to eminent domain.
II. BACKGROUND: A CENTURY OLD TRADITION
The background of the Kelo case is the story of a conflict be-
tween a Connecticut city in dire need of economic revitalization
and a few of its long-time residents struggling to protect their
homes from city condemnation. Compared with the rest of Con-
necticut, the median household income for residents of the City of
New London is 37% less than the rest of the State; the City's pov-
erty rate is 100% higher; and its unemployment rate 24%
greater. 34 In 1990, after "[d]ecades of economic decline," the state
of Connecticut designated New London as a "distressed munici-
pality"35 and later reactivated the New London Development Cor-
poration ("NLDC") "to assist the city in planning economic
development." 36 By 1998, New London's "unemployment rate was
nearly double that of the State, and its population ... was at its
lowest since 1920."3 7 In 2000, the city council approved an NLDC
development plan focusing on the City's Fort Trumbell area.38
The plan was "projected to create in excess of 1,000 jobs, to in-
crease tax and other revenues, and to revitalize [the] economically
distressed city, including its downtown and waterfront areas. '39
The NLDC was able to negotiate the purchase of most of the real
estate in the proposed development area,40 which "comprise[d] ap-
proximately 115 privately owned properties, as well as the 32
acres of land formerly occupied by [a] naval facility."4 1 Pursuant
to state law and city council authorization, NLDC then exerted
eminent domain power to begin condemnation proceedings over
the remaining fifteen parcels. 42
34. New London, Connecticut, CERC Town Profile 2005, http://products.cerc.com/
pdf/tp/newlondon.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2006).
35. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473.
36. Id. ("These conditions prompted state and local officials to target New London
... for economic revitalization. To this end, respondent New London Development
Corporation (NLDC), a private nonprofit entity established some years earlier to as-
sist the City in planning economic development, was reactivated.").
37. Id.
38. Id. at 472.
39. Id. (citing Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004)).
40. Id. at 475.
41. Id. at 474.
42. Id. at 475.
2007] 277
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These remaining parcels were owned by the nine petitioners
in the Kelo case.43 Among their stories is that of Susette Kelo who
"has lived in the Fort Trumbull area since 1997 [and] has made
extensive improvements to her house, which she prizes for its
water view. '44 There is also the story of Wilhemina Dery whose
house, having been owned by her family for over a century, 45 was
the place of her birth in 1918 and has served as her home for her
entire lifetime.46 Her husband Charles "moved into the house
when they married in 1946" and "[tiheir son lives next door with
his family in the house he received as a wedding gift."47 In total,
ten of the fifteen disputed parcels at issue in Kelo were "occupied
by the owner or a family member."48 None of the parcels were
found to be "blighted49 or otherwise in poor condition; rather, they
were condemned only because they happen to be located in the
development area."50
Given the circumstances of the Kelo petitioners, it is difficult
to view this case without immense sympathy for their situation.
Indeed, the Kelo decision spawned outrage on the part of citizens
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 475.
47. Id. at 495 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 475.
49. Although the term "blighted" can be defined more literally, case law indorses
a liberal definition:
Many factors and interrelationships of factors may be significant. These
may include such diverse matters as irregularity of the plots, inadequacy
of the streets, diversity of land ownership making assemblage of property
difficult, imcompatibility [sic] of the existing mixture of residential and
industrial property, overcrowding, the incidence of crime, lack of sanita-
tion, the drain an area makes on municipal services, fire hazards, traffic
congestion, and pollution. It can encompass areas in the process of deteri-
oration or threatened with it as well as ones already rendered useless,
prevention being an important purpose. It is "something more than dete-
riorated structures. It involves improper land use. Therefore its causes,
originating many years ago, include not only outmoded and deteriorated
structures, but unwise planning and zoning, poor regulatory code provi-
sions, and inadequate provisions for the flow of traffic." For, the public
safety, public health and public welfare, all legitimate objects of the police
power, are broad and inclusive. And it may even include vacant land.
Nor is it necessary that the degree of deterioration or precise percentage
of obsolescence or mathematical measurement of other factors be arrived
at with precision, since the combination and effects of such things are
highly variable.
Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327, 332 (N.Y. 1975) (citations
omitted).
50. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475.
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol24/iss1/11
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and lawmakers alike.51 It is this reaction that reaches to the
heart of the conflict between perceived property rights52 and the
power of eminent domain.
At issue in Kelo was whether New London's economic develop-
ment plan qualified as a "public use."5 3 While the petitioners
called for a narrow interpretation of the Fifth Amendment's public
use requirement, 54 arguing "that any taking justified by the pro-
motion of economic development must be treated by the courts as
per se invalid, or at least presumptively invalid,"55 the majority
reasoned that the Supreme Court has never proscribed public use
by limiting it in such a way:
[T]his "Court long ago rejected any literal requirement that con-
demned property be put into use for the general public." Indeed,
while many state courts in the mid-19th century endorsed "use
by the public" as the proper definition of public use, that narrow
view steadily eroded over time. Not only was the "use by the
public" test difficult to administer (e.g., what proportion of the
public need have access to the property? at what price?), but it
proved to be impractical given the diverse and always evolving
needs of society. Accordingly, when this Court began applying
the Fifth Amendment to the States at the close of the 19th cen-
tury, it embraced the broader and more natural interpretation
of public use as "public purpose." Thus, in a case upholding a
mining company's use of an aerial bucket line to transport ore
over property it did not own, Justice Holmes' opinion for the
Court stressed "the inadequacy of use by the general public as a
universal test." We have repeatedly and consistently rejected
that narrow test ever since. 56
51. See David Schultz, What's Yours Can be Mine: Are there Any Private Takings
After Kelo v. City of New London?, 24 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 195, 234 n.2 (2006)
(citing a number of articles discussing "the efforts in Congress and the states after the
Kelo opinion to condemn it or limit it with legislation," "how the Kelo opinion is caus-
ing a backlash against many projects involving the use of eminent domain," and "the
adverse reaction many states had to the Kelo opinion and efforts being taken at the
state level to place limits on the use of eminent domain for economic development
purposes.") (citations omitted).
52. See generally Goldstein, supra note 5, at 375-87 (enumeration and discussion
of the various rights accompanying property ownership including the right to possess,
use, consume or destroy, modify, alienate, and transmit).
53. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 472 ("The question presented is whether the city's proposed
disposition of this property qualifies as a 'public use' within the meaning of the Tak-
ings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.").
54. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation").
55. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 492 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 479-80 (citations omitted).
2007] 279
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As early as 1896, the Supreme Court equated the terms "pub-
lic use" and "public purpose." In United States v. Gettysburg Elec-
tric Railway Co., the Court permitted the taking of a strip of land
from a railroad company to preserve the battlefield lines at Get-
tysburg-not for actual use by the public or a utility benefiting the
public but for historic preservation. 57 Upholding a challenged por-
tion of the 1893 Sundry Civil Appropriation Act, the Court held
that public use is not limited to takings that effect a use or right to
use by the public and stated: "when the legislature has declared
the use or purpose to be a public one, its judgment will be
respected by the courts, unless the use be palpably without rea-
sonable foundation."58
In 1905, the Supreme Court allowed the condemnation of a
right-of-way through a landowner's property for the transport of
water because the neighboring land would otherwise have been
worthless. 59 The case, Clark v. Nash, is an example of a private-
to-private transfer (with no actual use of the condemned property
by the public) where a public purpose is nevertheless deemed pre-
sent. The Court in Clark upheld a state statute permitting the
condemnation by emphasizing the importance of deference:
[Where the right of condemnation is asserted under a state
statute, we are always, where it can fairly be done, strongly in-
clined to hold with the state courts, when they uphold a state
statute providing for such condemnation .... [The local courts]
understand the situation which led to the demand for the enact-
ment of the statute, and they also appreciate the results upon
the growth and prosperity of the State, which in all probability
would flow from a denial of its validity.60
In the 1906 case of Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining
Co., the Supreme Court upheld the taking of a right-of-way over
private land to allow a mining company to transport ore in aerial
buckets. 61 This transfer of property rights was completely pri-
vate-to-private and concerned the economic development of the
state of Utah's mineral resources. In Strickley, the plaintiffs ar-
gued that the condemned right-of-way was "solely for private use,
and that the taking of their land for that purpose [was] contrary to
57. United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 681-83 (1896).
58. Id. at 680 (emphasis added).
59. Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 369 (1905).
60. Id. at 368.
61. Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 529, 532 (1906).
[Vol. 24280
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the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States."62 The mining company countered by relying upon a Utah
statute providing "that 'the right of eminent domain may be exer-
cised in [sic] behalf of the following public uses: . . .(6) Roads,
railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes and dumping
places to facilitate the milling, smelting or other reduction of ores,
or the working of mines."' 63 At issue in Strickley was the constitu-
tionality of this statute. 64 The Supreme Court held:
"In the opinion of the legislature and the Supreme Court of
Utah the public welfare of that State demands that aerial lines
between the mines upon its mountain sides and the railways in
the valleys below should not be made impossible by the refusal
of a private owner to sell the right to cross his land. The Consti-
tution of the United States does not require us to say that they
are wrong."65
Another case arising in a "purely economic context," and cited
by the Kelo court,66 is Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto.67 As Kelo dis-
cussed, Monsanto upheld a provision of the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act "under which the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") could consider the data (including
trade secrets) submitted by a prior applicant in evaluating a sub-
sequent application, so long as the second applicant paid just com-
pensation for the data."68 The public benefit achieved in this case
was the expedited entrance of valuable chemical products into the
marketplace. The Court held that the "EPA's consideration or dis-
closure of data submitted ... to the agency ... [did] not effect a
taking" under the Fifth Amendment. 69 The Court "found suffi-
cient Congress' belief that sparing applicants the cost of time-con-
suming research eliminated a significant barrier to entry in the
pesticide market and thereby enhanced competition."70
The Kelo decision also cites the case of Berman v. Parker.71
Berman upheld the condemnation of a non-blighted parcel located
62. Id. at 530.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 530-31.
65. Id. at 531.
66. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 482 (2005).
67. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
68. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 482.
69. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1013.
70. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482.
71. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
2007]
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within a blighted area targeted for redevelopment. This case, con-
taining some of the most frequently quoted language regarding
the concept of public welfare, holds:
[Courts should] not sit to determine whether a particular hous-
ing project is or is not desirable. The concept of the public wel-
fare is broad and inclusive .... The values it represents are
spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is
within the power of the legislature to determine that the com-
munity should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well
as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled .... It is
not for [the Court] to reappraise [these values].72
The Kelo majority also relied on the case of Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff73 where a unanimous Court deferred again to
legislative judgment. In Midkiff, "the Court considered a Hawaii
statute whereby fee title[74] was taken from lessors and trans-
ferred to lessees (for just compensation) in order to reduce the con-
centration of land ownership."75 Refusing to accept the argument
that the public character of a taking was altered solely because
the State transferred the taken property to private individuals af-
ter condemnation, the Court concluded "that the State's purpose
of eliminating the 'social and economic evils of a land oligopoly' [76]
qualified as a valid public use" and held that "it is only the tak-
ing's purpose, and not its mechanics, that must pass scrutiny
under the Public Use Clause."77
Arguing further for a policy of legislative deference, the Kelo
majority cited the case of Lingle v. Chevron.78 As discussed in
Part I, supra, Lingle clearly delineated four categories of regula-
tory takings cases. 79 Lingle's fourth category of adjudicative land
use exactions,80 typified by the Nollan and Dolan cases, is signifi-
cant to the eminent domain discussion. This is because the right
to exclude, at issue in both Nollan and Dolan, is an essential stick
72. Id. at 33 (citation omitted).
73. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
74. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 630 (7th ed. 1999) ("fee simple" is an interest in land
that is "the broadest property interest allowed by law;" "fee simple absolute" is "[aln
estate of indefinite or potentially indefinite duration.").
75. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 481.
76. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241.
77. Id. at 244-45.
78. Kelo, 545 U.S. 487.
79. See supra note 19.
80. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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in the "bundle of rights""" and it is the right to own the entire
bundle that is taken through eminent domain. The Nollan Court
held that in the case of an adjudicative land use exaction,8 2 there
must be an "essential nexus" between the condition imposed and
the stated purpose of the underlying land use restriction. 3 In Do-
lan, the Court, building on the Nollan case, further heightened its
standard by holding that an "individualized determination" must
be made showing some "rough proportionality" between the bur-
den imposed on the property by the regulation and the negative
impact the property's proposed development would have on the
public.8 4
III. ANALYSIS: IN SEARCH OF PROPORTIONALITY
Both Nollan and Dolan dealt with the protection of the right
to exclude others-a right that is "one of the most essential sticks
in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as prop-
erty."8 5 The implication of this fundamental property right is crit-
ical to warranting the higher level of scrutiny required by the
Nollan and Dolan cases.8 6 The right to exclude is similar to the
importance of the property rights impinged by eminent domain, 7
suggesting perhaps that closer scrutiny and less deference (as ar-
gued by the Kelo petitioners)88 is necessary in some condemnation
cases. Although the Kelo majority warns that "[t]he disadvan-
tages of a heightened form of review are especially pronounced in
this type of case,"8 9 if eminent domain cases are properly catego-
rized, a heightened standard of review-a standard similar to Do-
lan's rough proportionality but applicable to eminent domain-
could be employed in certain economic development situations
81. See Goldstein, supra note 30 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 28.
83. See supra note 26.
84. See supra note 27.
85. Id. at 384 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979));
see also Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831.
86. See Smith v. Mendon, 822 N.E.2d 1214, 1219-20 (N.Y. 2004) (Because there
was no "transfer of the most important 'stick' in the proverbial bundle of property
rights, the right to exclude others," the court refused to review the case under the
higher scrutiny required by Nollan and Dolan. Instead, the court turned to the for-
merly valid Agins test that was later overruled in Lingle and to the still-valid Penn
Central standard).
87. See generally Goldstein, supra note 30 and accompanying text.
88. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 487 (2005) ("[Pletitioners maintain
that for takings of this kind we should require a 'reasonable certainty' that the ex-
pected public benefits will actually accrue.").
89. Id. at 488.
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without resulting in a "significant impediment to the successful
consummation of many such [development] plans,"90 as the major-
ity fears.
A. Eminent Domain Categories One & Two: A Clear
Public Purpose
The first two categories of eminent domain cases are easily
identifiable and are explained by Justice O'Connor in her dissent-
ing opinion in Kelo.91 The first category is that of public owner-
ship, where the government takes and retains title to the
condemned property. 92 In this category, usually comprising public
works or projects, "the sovereign may transfer private property to
public ownership."93 Examples provided by Justice O'Connor of
such public works include roads, hospitals, and military bases.
94
The second category is that of actual use of the property by the
public, even when private parties may gain title to the govern-
mentally condemned land.95 In these cases, "the sovereign may
transfer private property to private parties, often common carri-
ers, who make the property available for the public's use."96 Ex-
amples of these property transfers include railroads, public
utilities, and stadiums. 97
But as O'Connor states in Kelo, "'public ownership' and 'use-
by-the-public' are sometimes too constricting and impractical...
to define the scope of the Public Use Clause."9 8 The first two cate-
gories, as well as the third, described infra,99 warrant the policy of
judicial deference to legislative determinations argued in the ma-
jority opinion. These three categories share a clear public interest
and are free from impermissible private motivation. It is with a
fourth category that a court's suspicions of insufficient public pur-
pose are raised and a legislature, subject to a higher level of scru-
tiny, must show some level of proportionality in weighing the
dominant public purpose against the exaction of a person's right to
90. Id.
91. Id. at 497-98 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.; see also id. at 477 ("[A] State may transfer property from one private party
to another if future 'use by the public' is the purpose of the taking; the condemnation
of land for a railroad with common-carrier duties is a familiar example.").
98. Id. at 498 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
99. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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own. Both the third and fourth categories of eminent domain
cases include the situation of economic development projects sub-
ject to debate in Kelo. 100
B. Eminent Domain Category Three: Economic
Development and Public Exigency
As Justice Kennedy, citing the trial court, wrote in his Kelo
concurring opinion:
Where the purpose [of a taking] is economic development and
that development is to be carried out by private parties or pri-
vate parties will be benefited, the court must decide if the stated
public purpose-economic advantage to a city sorely in need of
it-is only incidental to the benefits that will be confined on pri-
vate parties of a development plan. 101
In line with this reasoning, the third proposed category of em-
inent domain cases contains two situations in which public bene-
fits are not incidental to private benefits. Though the Kelo dissent
limits it to only circumstances meeting "certain exigencies, 10 2
this category should be more expansive.10 3 This third category is
two-pronged and comprises: (1) economic development with a sig-
100. Writing for the dissent, Justice O'Connor deals flatly with this issue by asking
and answering, "Are economic development takings constitutional? I would hold that
they are not." Kelo, 545 U.S. at 498 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 498 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[Wie have allowed that, in certain cir-
cumstances and to meet certain exigencies, takings that serve a public purpose also
satisfy the Constitution even if the property is destined for subsequent private use.")
(citations omitted).
103. For an example of a discussion of the evolution of economic development con-
demnations, see Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327, 330 (N.Y.
1975) ("Historically, urban renewal began as an effort to remove 'substandard and
insanitary' [sic] conditions which threatened the health and welfare of the public, in
other words 'slums' . . . whose eradication was in itself found to constitute a public
purpose for which the condemnation powers of government might constitutionally be
employed. Gradually, as the complexities of urban conditions became better under-
stood, it has become clear that the areas eligible for such renewal are not limited to
'slums' as that term was formerly applied, and that, among other things, economic
underdevelopment and stagnation are also threats to the public sufficient to make
their removal cognizable as a public purpose."). See also Kelo, 545 U.S. at 486 ("The
public end may be as well or better served through an agency of private enterprise
than through a department of government-or so the Congress might conclude. We
cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes
of community redevelopment projects." (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34
(1954))).
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nificant governmental presence. 04 and (2) condemnations that re-
spond to public exigencies. 105
Courts have long recognized "that the sovereign may not take
the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another
private party B, even though A is paid just compensation. '" 1 0 6 But
not all economic development plans need fall beneath this um-
brella of outright invalid private-to-private takings. Where con-
demnations are carried out in order to achieve significant public
objectives, they are not analogous to one-to-one transfers for the
sole benefit of the transferee. To determine whether an economic
development plan meets the public use requirement 10 7 and de-
serves judicial deference to the legislature, a court should look for
indications of a significant governmental presence' 08 or of exi-
gency.' 0 9 Should the economic development plan arise outside of
one of these two third-category situations, the plan (still not out-
right invalid) can be scrutinized under the higher standard of re-
view in category four." 0 In addition, when a condemnation that
does fall into this third category also has the presence of other
conditions raising a court's suspicions (that an insufficient public
purpose is present),"' the fourth category is implicated and the
higher standard of review applied." 2
1. Indicia of Governmental Presence
To help define this third category, various development plan
elements that indicate a significant governmental presence are
employed. Many of these elements are found within the Kelo case,
including: the existence "of a comprehensive development plan
meant to address a serious city-wide depression;"'" 3 an integrated
development plan having both state-level and city-level ap-
104. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
105. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 4898-99 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 477. This sole "private purpose" type of case falls outside the categories
of condemnations that can be found valid. See id. at 487 ("[A] one-to-one transfer of
property, executed outside the confines of an integrated development plan, is not
presented in this case .... [S]uch an unusual exercise of government power would
certainly raise a suspicion that a private purpose was afoot .... ").
107. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation").
108. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
109. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
110. See discussion infra Part III.C.
111. See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
112. See discussion infra Part III.C.
113. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 493 (2005).
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proval;114 open public meetings to discuss the development; 1 5
"thorough deliberation" preceding the plan's adoption;11 6 a state
designation of the municipality as in need of economic redevelop-
ment;11 7 and state and local financial investment, 18 especially
"the substantial commitment of public funds by the State to the
development project before most of the private beneficiaries [are]
known."11 9 A further relevant indication of governmental pres-
ence may be the extent of municipally-provided public infrastruc-
ture, for example: public marinas for recreational uses, pedestrian
riverwalks and other walkways, state parks, museums, public
parking;1 20 schools, parks, streets, and other public facilities' 21
within the area-wide development plan.
2. Indicia of Exigencies
The second prong of this third category comprises condemna-
tions that respond to public exigencies. In her dissenting opinion
in Kelo, Justice O'Connor writes: "[W]e have allowed that, in cer-
tain circumstances and to meet certain exigencies, takings that
serve a public purpose also satisfy the Constitution even if the
property is destined for subsequent private use.' 22 There are a
number of exigent circumstances that may indicate a situation in
which condemnation is necessary and valid. By looking at prior
cases, it is possible to construct a list of factors that can be used by
courts analogously to determine when the power of eminent do-
main serves a requisite public purpose.
The first of these factors asks whether there is an imminent
threat to a national historic treasure. For example, in Gettysburg
Electric Railway, the exigency was the "imminent danger that
portions of [the Gettysburg] battlefield may be irreparably defaced
by the construction of a railway over [the historic site] .... 23 In
this case, there was a clear danger that portions of the battlefield
could be permanently harmed by the construction of a railroad.
To prevent this harm to the public, Congress authorized condem-
114. Id. at 473-74.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 484.
117. Id. at 473.
118. Id. at 473-74.
119. Id. at 491-92.
120. Id. at 474.
121. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954).
122. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 498 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
123. United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 685 (1896).
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nation of the railroad's right-of-way over that land. In the Court's
words: "No narrow view of the character of this proposed use
should be taken. Its national character and importance, we think,
are plain. The power to condemn for this purpose need not be
plainly and unmistakably deduced from any one of the particu-
larly specified powers."124 In this case, there was no intended
physical use by the public, no public access, and no intent to con-
struct a public project (for example, a monument to the fallen war
heroes). Without swift and decisive action by the government,
however, a cultural and historical asset would have been endan-
gered. This was an exigency deemed sufficient by the Court to
justify the condemnation of the railroad's right-of-way. The Court
noted the words of Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Mary-
land: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adequate to that end, which are not prohibited but consis-
tent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitu-
tional."1 25 This case stands for the proposition that substantial
and long-term damage to the patrimony of the people justifies the
exercise of the power of eminent domain.
The next factor asks whether a taking is required to eliminate
conditions that substantially impede economic expansion at a crit-
ical moment in time. In Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining
Co., the issue was whether a state statute allowed the condemna-
tion of a right-of-way over privately-owned land to allow a private
mining company to transport its ore to market.126 The Utah state
statute permitted the condemnation of private land on behalf of
several uses including "dumping places to facilitate the milling,
smelting or other reduction of ores, or the working of mines.' 27
The plaintiff objected to the condemnation of a right-of-way over
his property to allow the defendant, a private mining company, to
place towers on his lands and construct an aerial bucket line over
the property to transport ore from the defendant's mine, over the
plaintiffs land, to the railway station. The case involved condi-
tions that thwarted the private sector's exploitation of the state of
Utah's mineral resources, which was closely related to the ability
of the state and its economic enterprises to expand and develop at
124. Id. at 683.
125. Id. at 681 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
126. See Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906).
127. Id. at 530.
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a critical time in the history of the West. The state court sus-
tained the taking of the right-of-way even though the mining com-
pany itself paid the required just compensation. Mr. Justice
Holmes wrote this decision for the Strickley court citing Clark v.
Nash,128 a case that previously upheld the constitutionality of the
Utah statute, for the proposition that "there might be exceptional
times and places in which the very foundations of public welfare
could not be laid without requiring concessions from individuals to
each other upon due compensation which under other circum-
stances would be left wholly to voluntary consent." 129
Another indication of exigent circumstances is where land is
held in a manner that perpetuates great economic discrimina-
tion. 130 As the Kelo court noted, the exigency in Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff was an extreme "[cloncentration of land own-
ership."131 The state of Hawaii adopted the Land Reform Act of
1967,132 which permitted the Hawaii Housing Authority ("the Au-
thority") to condemn title to residential land and transfer owner-
ship of it to individuals who leased and lived on the land. The
legislature was concerned about the economic effect of the concen-
tration of land ownership in a state where the government owned
nearly half of the land and fully forty-seven percent of the land
was owned by only seventy-two private individuals. 133  In the
words of Justice O'Connor, who wrote for a unanimous Court in
upholding the statute, "[t]he legislature concluded that concen-
trated land ownership was responsible for skewing the State's res-
idential fee simple market,[134] inflating land prices, and injuring
the public tranquility and welfare."1 35 The statute created a con-
demnation scheme under which fee simple title136 of designated
private lands could be condemned by the Authority and trans-
128. Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905).
129. Strickley, 200 U.S. at 531.
130. See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
131. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 499 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
132. HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 516-1 to 516-204 (1967).
133. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 499 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (The "[cloncentration of land
ownership was so dramatic that on [Hawaii's] most urbanized island, Oahu, 22 land-
owners owned 72.5% of the fee simple titles. The Hawaii Legislature . . . concluded
that the oligopoly in land ownership was 'skewing the State's residential fee simple
market, inflating land prices, and injuring the public tranquility and welfare,' and
therefore enacted a condemnation scheme for redistributing title.") (citation omitted).
134. See BLAci's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 74.
135. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 232.
136. See BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 74.
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ferred to the lessees of those lands. The Authority, in turn, was
authorized to lend these purchasers up to ninety percent of the
purchase price.
Justice O'Connor based the Court's decision in Midkiff on
Berman v. Parker, a case providing another example of exigent
circumstances: where substandard conditions perpetuate poverty
and block economic revitalization. 137 In Berman v. Parker the
Court, again unanimously, upheld both the taking of the plain-
tiffs unblighted land to further the redevelopment of slum areas
and the sale of the plaintiffs land to private developers for urban
redevelopment purposes. 138 Writing for the Court in Midkiff,
O'Connor noted:
[W]here the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally
related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never
held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use
Clause. On this basis, we have no trouble concluding that the
Hawaii Act is constitutional. The people of Hawaii have at-
tempted, much as the settlers of the original 13 Colonies did, to
reduce the perceived social and economic evils of a land oligop-
oly traceable to their monarch. The land oligopoly has, accord-
ing to the Hawaii Legislature, created artificial deterrents to
the normal function of the State's residential land market and
forced thousands of individual homeowners to lease, rather than
buy, the land underneath their homes. Regulating oligopoly
and the evils associated with it is a classic exercise of a State's
police powers. We cannot disapprove of Hawaii's exercise of this
power. 139
Though these are some of the factors indicating exigent cir-
cumstances ascertainable from case law relevant to Kelo, this list
is far from exhaustive. It is important to remember that "[t]he
versatility of circumstances often mocks a natural desire for defin-
137. See generally Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
138. Id. at 36. The Kelo court discussed the neighborhood at issue in Berman:
The neighborhood had so deteriorated that, for example, 64.3% of its
dwellings were beyond repair. It had become burdened with "overcrowd-
ing of dwellings," "lack of adequate streets and alleys," and "lack of light
and air." Congress had determined that the neighborhood had become
"injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare" and that it
was necessary to "eliminate all such injurious conditions by employing all
means necessary and appropriate for the purpose," including eminent
domain.
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 498 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
139. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241-42 (citations omitted).
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itiveness" 140 and so each case will turn upon its own facts to deter-
mine the extent to which condemnation is, if at all, necessary.
Two conclusions can be made from reviewing these exigency
cases of the Supreme Court. First, each of these cases allowed the
taking of private land to accomplish a public objective that was
unique to that place and time. The range of topics is broad, but
the contextual circumstance is narrow-a legislatively deter-
mined public need of the first order. These are not inconsequen-
tial matters and, where they are not, the Court has no trouble
sustaining the condemnation of private land, nor even the transfer
of that land to private parties who pay all or part of the compensa-
tion award. 141 Second, within this realm of takings, the Court
made it clear that its role was narrow and deferential. As Justice
O'Connor wrote in Midkiff, "[t]here is, of course, a role for courts
to play in reviewing a legislature's judgment of what constitutes a
public use, even when the eminent domain power is equated with
the police power. But the Court in Berman made clear that it is
'an extremely narrow' one." 142
3. Factors Raising Suspicion
When a condemnation effected to achieve economic develop-
ment falls into the third category of economic development tak-
ings, but involves circumstances raising a court's suspicions that
an insufficient public purpose is present, the case then converts
into a fourth category case of eminent domain, and a higher judi-
cial standard is applied. 43 The purpose for this safety net is to
protect property rights against economic development plans that
meet all of the requirements of category three but are nonetheless
suspect and therefore deserve closer judicial scrutiny.
An example of such a scenario occurred in the case of Bailey v.
Meyers.14 4 There, the "Town Center" redevelopment plan for
Mesa City, Arizona did not originally include the land on which
the plaintiff, Randall Bailey, operated his family business. 145 Af-
ter the owner of an Ace Hardware store expressed interest in relo-
cating his store to a street corner just outside of the
redevelopment area, the City Council passed resolutions ex-
140. Weiner v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 352 (1958).
141. See, e.g., Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906).
142. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240.
143. See discussion infra Part III.C.
144. Bailey v. Myers, 76 P.3d 898 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
145. Id. at 899.
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panding the redevelopment area to include the Bailey's property,
which meant that the Bailey's business would be condemned. 146
The City Council's justification was that it wanted to create "an
attractive and revitalized 'gateway' to the downtown area."147 To
the Arizona Court of Appeals, the existence of the city's compre-
hensive plan and the public benefits flowing from the redevelop-
ment were not enough to legitimize the taking.1 48
As the legal community has noted, "the facts of the case were
... important: the original comprehensive plan did not include the
property in dispute. Instead, the plan was amended, seemingly at
the request of another private business that wanted the property.
The facts here looked suspicious to the court."1 49 Undoubtedly, a
court faced with a case such as Bailey would be apprehensive
about affording its legislature complete deference in planning for
redevelopment. Circumstances, however, will not always be so
clear.
Factors typically raising a court's suspicions include: a lack of
opportunities for public input and reaction to a development
plan;150 the absence of significant studies by state agencies re-
garding "the project's economic, environmental, and social ramifi-
cations;"1 5 and no showing that a variety of development plans
were reviewed and that the private developer chosen was from a
group of applicants rather than preselected.' 5 2 It is also suspi-
cious if the identities of many of the private beneficiaries were
known at the time the city formulated its plans. 153 Further, it is
suspicious if: a city refuses to comply with "procedural require-
ments that facilitate review of the record and inquiry into the
city's purposes;" 5 4 there is anything in the record indicating that
the city was primarily "motivated by a desire to aid.., particular
private entities;"' 55 an integrated development plan is lacking;' 56
careful deliberation did not precede the development plan's adop-
tion;' 57 there is a lack of anything on the record indicating a sub-
146. Id. at 899-900.
147. Id. at 900.
148. Id. at 904.
149. Schultz, supra note 51, at 233.
150. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 473-74 (2005).
151. Id.
152. See id. at 492.
153. See id.
154. Id. at 493.
155. Id. at 492.
156. See id. at 487.
157. See id. at 484.
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stantial public benefit; or the original development plan was
revised or expanded to include the property at issue. 158
C. Eminent Domain Category Four & The Proportional
Benefit Test
In his concurring opinion in Kelo, Justice Kennedy explained
that his agreement with the majority did "not foreclose the possi-
bility that a more stringent standard of review than that [of defer-
ence to the legislature] announced in Berman and Midkiff might
be appropriate for a more narrowly drawn category of takings ....
This demanding level of scrutiny, however, is not required simply
because the purpose of the taking is economic development." 159
Between the third category of economic development takings and
those private transfers considered to be outright invalid, 160 lies
the fourth and final eminent domain category-the "more nar-
rowly drawn category of takings" forecasted by Kennedy.1 61 Not
meeting the requirements of category three, this fourth category
comprises condemnations for the purpose of economic develop-
ment where there is a lack of evidence of a significant governmen-
tal presence or exigency, or, in the case of plans meeting those
requirements, transfers that otherwise raise a court's suspicions
"that a private purpose [is] afoot."162
In her dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor responds to the
majority's decision and Kennedy's concurrence by expressing fear
that although the particular facts in Kelo might provide a legiti-
mate public purpose, the precedent set by the case could allow
"property transfers generated with less care, that are less compre-
hensive, that happen to result from [a] less elaborate process,
whose only projected advantage is the incidence of higher taxes, or
that hope to transform an already prosperous city into an even
more prosperous one."' 63 These words from Justice O'Connor
characterize situations in which a significant governmental pres-
ence or public exigency is lacking. Indeed, if courts are not re-
quired to hold such property transfers subject to a higher level of
scrutiny, Justice O'Connor's fears could be realized. However, by
158. See Bailey v. Myers, 76 P.3d 898 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
159. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
160. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) ("A purely private
taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve
no legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void.").
161. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 487.
163. Id. at 504 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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creating a fourth category for these transfers and a higher stan-
dard of review, individual property interests can be guarded while
allowing only economic development condemnations that are legit-
imately for a public use and not merely incidental to private bene-
fits to proceed.
What the Kelo dissent fears is a de minimis public purpose
becoming the basis for taking private homes and businesses. To
prevent this from happening, a court would need to do more than
simply review whether "the legislature's purpose is legitimate and
its means are not irrational. ' 164 A court should instead raise the
bar by requiring the government to proportionally weigh a domi-
nant public purpose165 against "the severity of the burden that
government imposes upon private property rights."16 6 In this
fourth category of eminent domain cases, courts could apply a test
similar to Nollan's "essential nexus" 67 and Dolan's "rough propor-
tionality"168 (the fourth category in the regulatory takings
scheme), and impose a burden of proof on the government to
demonstrate that the taking achieves a public purpose. The mi-
nority in the Supreme Court of Connecticut Kelo decision argued
for a "clear and convincing evidence" test,169 which seems similar
to Dolan's "rough proportionality" standard. 70 This test, how-
ever, steers too close to the "mathematical precision" rejected by
the Court in Dolan. 71 Instead, courts should address the fourth
category of eminent domain cases in the following way: A court's
suspicion is raised and a higher level of scrutiny is warranted
when condemnation in pursuit of economic development objectives
does not involve a significant governmental presence, clear public
exigencies are absent, or conditions exist otherwise indicating
164. Id. at 488.
165. See, e.g., Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327, 331 (N.Y.
1975).
166. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
167. The Nollan court first used the term "essential nexus," which is now a stan-
dard term in takings jurisprudence. See supra note 26.
168. For the Dolan court's explanation of its creation of the "rough proportionality"
test, see supra note 27. Development projects passing the rough proportionality test
fit within the fourth category in the regulatory takings scheme.
169. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477 ("The three dissenting justices would have imposed a
'heightened' standard of judicial review for takings justified by economic develop-
ment. Although they agreed that the plan was intended to serve a valid public use,
they would have found all the takings unconstitutional because the City had failed to
adduce 'clear and convincing evidence' that the economic benefits of the plan would in
fact come to pass.").
170. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
171. See supra note 27.
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that public benefits might be incidental to the private purpose of
the taking. In these cases, the condemnor must show to the
court's satisfaction that the taking of an individual's title to prop-
erty serves an important and meaningful public purpose.
The Dolan Court, eschewing deference to the legislature,
heightened the standard of review for regulatory takings and re-
quired the government to "make some sort of individualized deter-
mination that the required dedication [was] related both in nature
and extent to the impact of the proposed development."1 72 Simi-
larly, by using a more intermediate level of scrutiny173 and by
placing the burden on the government instead of the challenger,
the fundamental property rights affected by eminent domain are
offered greater protection. By requiring the condemnor to demon-
strate the particular public benefits to be achieved, a court can be
satisfied that there is sufficient weight to balance the taking of fee
simple absolute title174 (the complete "bundle of rights"175), thus
achieving the required proportionality between the property
owner's loss and the public's gain. In doing so, a court avoids per-
mitting the type of takings feared by the Kelo dissent17 6 while still
making available the Public Use Clause 7 7 to cases involving eco-
nomic development. If a category four case cannot satisfy this im-
portant and meaningful public purpose standard, then the taking
will be found to impermissibly encroach upon property rights and
will be held invalid.
172. Id.
173. A level similar in kind to the intermediate level of scrutiny required in some
constitutional law cases falling under the guard of the Equal Protection Clause, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV. For example, "[t]o withstand constitutional challenge, previous
cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
174. See supra note 74.
175. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
176. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 504 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) ("property transfers generated with less care, that are less comprehensive, that
happen to result from [a] less elaborate process, whose only projected advantage is the
incidence of higher taxes, or that hope to transform an already prosperous city into an
even more prosperous one.").
177. U.S. CONST. amend. V. ("nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation").
2007]
25
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
IV. CONCLUSION: THE EXERCISE OF PRACTICAL
JUDGMENT
Ultimately, categorizing and addressing eminent domain
cases should not be approached with the mathematical precision
cautioned against in Dolan.178 The distinctions between catego-
ries three and four, and impermissible private-to-private transfers
are difficult to characterize with bright line definitions. But, as
Justice O'Connor points out, "it is in the nature of things that the
boundaries between these categories are not always firm."179
Rather, "[tihese matters call for the exercise of a considerable de-
gree of practical judgment, common sense and sound
discretion.' 8 0
What is proposed in this article is a framework for the classi-
fication of eminent domain condemnations in line with that of the
regulatory takings scheme set forth in Lingle' 8 ' that meets the
fears of the Kelo dissenters. Akin to the regulatory takings
scheme, there are four discrete categories of eminent domain
cases: (1) public ownership of taken property; (2) actual use by the
public of property; (3) economic development with a significant
governmental presence or exigent circumstance; and (4) a fourth
higher level of scrutiny category where, in cases of economic devel-
opment lacking a significant governmental presence, social exi-
gency, or otherwise raising suspicions, the taking of an
individual's title to property must serve an important and mean-
ingful public purpose. Through this framework, condemnations
are limited to three clear categories where the public interest is
great and one where the condemnor must demonstrate the public
interest achieved to the courts satisfaction. By holding other tak-
ings to be invalid, this exposes those takings that are privately
motivated, that fall outside of the century-old understanding of
public use, and quiets the alarm sounded because of concerns of
an overbroad reading of the Kelo case.' 8 2
178. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
179. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 497 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
180. Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327, 332 (N.Y. 1975).
181. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
182. Justice O'Connor feared such an overbroad reading:
[N]early any lawful use of real private property can be said to generate
some incidental benefit to the public. Thus, if predicted (or even guaran-
teed) positive side-effects are enough to render transfer from one private
party to another constitutional, then the words "for public use" do not
realistically exclude any takings, and thus do not exert any constraint on
the eminent domain power .... The specter of condemnation hangs over
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As noted by the Kelo dissent, Alexander Hamilton described
"the security of Property" as one of the "great objects of Govern-
ment."18 3 For this reason and because of the plight of citizens like
Suzette Kelo and Wilhemina Dery, a higher standard of review is
necessary to protect property from the impermissible exertion of
the eminent domain power. Implementing a higher judicial stan-
dard for evaluating category four eminent domain cases provides a
reasonable check on the broad authority of many local govern-
ments and serves as a middle ground to meet the concerns of the
Kelo dissent while still allowing the Public Use Clause 84 to be
utilized for economic development.
all property. Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6
with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a
factory.
Kelo, 545 U.S at 501-03 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 496 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
184. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation").
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